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Price caps and the performance of IPOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of regulatory constraints ("price caps") on the variation of prices in the secondary 
market. The Greek stock market offers a unique arena for empirical research on this topic as three (3) substantial changes 
in price cap regulation were introduced in a period of only seven years (1993-1999). The results indicate significant 
differences in initial returns due to the effects of price caps. Price caps reduce underpricing unambiguously; the range of 
underpricing has also been significantly determined by the intensity of demand and market conditions in the Greek market. 
Our results are robust after controlling for the impact of „hot market‟ using several combinations, as well as a number of 
other control variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) constitute one of the most important activities in corporate finance, 
bringing substantial amounts of new capital to the corporate sector. In 2010 alone, when the global IPO 
activity recovered to pre financial crises levels, investors entrusted $286 billion on 1,393 new listed firms 
worldwide. The world witnessed the largest IPO ever, the US$22.1 billion offering of the state-owned 
Agricultural Bank of China.  
In this paper we focus on the impact of price variation limits imposed by regulation on IPO 
underpricing. The basis of the study is an extensive „experimentation‟ that took place in the Athens 
Stock Exchange in the 1990s, as regulatory authorities have imposed varying limitations on daily price 
variation for newly listed shares. More specifically, from 1990 to 2011, Greek daily limits on price 
variation, during early trading of newly listed firms, changed three times; they went from the extreme 
of „no limits‟ to the other extreme of narrow limits. The rationale for quantitative limits on daily price 
variation has been invariably the perception that rapid price changes are „destabilizing‟ and 
„speculative‟, therefore they must be slowed down. The means of doing this has been to suspend 
trading as price changes reach a prescribed limit. This is akin to „circuit breakers‟ that have been 
employed in the US and other markets. In the Greek case, these limits affected both the trading of 
seasoned shares and the trading of newly listed ones, but variations were also introduced between the 
two categories. 
The empirical literature on IPOs is extensive and international. The most voluminous branch of 
that literature concerns the short - term performance of newly listed shares and is exemplified by 
comparative studies such as Loughran et al. (1995) and Gajewski and Gresse (2006).  These studies 
establish that initial IPO underpricing is wide-ranging and suggest that the appearance of positive excess 
returns in the short run is quite a generalized phenomenon around the world. However, the size and 
intensity of underpricing have varied both across markets and times. These findings are based on the 
overperformance of IPO returns compared to market benchmarks over a day or short periods after 
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listing. Many factors have been examined to explain and account for this inefficiency but also to 
explain the variation of underpricing across space and time. The findings show that these are due to 
demand and investor sentiment, to competitive supply and the incentives of owners, and to incentives 
and competition among intermediaries such as underwriters. In very few instances, studies have 
analyzed regulatory constraints in this context [Pettway and Kaneko (1996)].  
 It is plausible that regulatory constraints can exert an influence on short term IPO performance. 
This is what regulators who impose various limits invariably believe. A direct form of constraint is the 
administrative restriction of the range of allowed price variation in early trading days. In Greek 
regulations, we have found a strong example of this type of constraint. Such restrictions clearly alter 
the pattern of returns in early trading and may affect the overall appearance of initial under-pricing. 
Under constraint, prices adjust more slowly than they would have, if no constraint existed and, we 
argue, that market agents adjust their behavior as well. 
Many have formulated theoretical views on the general impact of price limits for the general 
case of securities‟ trading, along several different lines of argument, most of which focus on whether 
price limits can affect volatility. One line of argument proposes that price limits are inefficient as they 
suppress rapid price discovery [Fama (1989)]. A contrary line of argument suggests that price limits 
offer opportunities for „cooling down‟ of investor sentiment and allow for both smoother price 
adjustment and lower volatility, Choudhry and Nanda (1998). A very interesting extension of this 
thinking is that the basic rationale for imposing price limits is the diminution of the potential for 
market manipulation by market participants who have the means to conduct manipulatory schemes, 
Kim and Park (2010).  
We can transpose the arguments to early trading of newly listed stocks. In this case, the 
question posed is whether limitations on price variation improve the efficiency of pricing? Investors 
typically know less about newly listed shares. Their behavior in early trading is conditioned by this 
basic fact. Regulators who impose limits clearly believe that they contribute to improved market 
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function. But is this the case? This is the issue that this study seeks to illuminate by using Greek stock 
market data and designing simple tests across regulatory regimes. 
The above raises several interesting questions. Does the price cap contribute to a reduction of 
underpricing by bringing the offer price closer to equilibrium price? Do regulatory limitations work to 
moderate investor‟s sentiment especially during the „hot‟ market periods? Finally, is there 
improvement in the efficiency of funding allocation under regulatory constraint?  Motivated by lack of 
empirical evidence on the subject, we address these questions and explore the role of price cap effects 
on underpricing. We use a comprehensive sample of IPOs listed over the period from 1990 to 2011. 
We find strong evidence that variation constraints reduce underpricing. 
This study makes several contributions to the IPOs literature. First, it suggests that price caps 
can play a key role in the pricing of IPOs and on the formation of short - term equilibrium returns. 
Second, it explores the time (number of days after the listing) needed for the prices of new listings to 
reach their market equilibrium level during periods with active price caps
2
. Third, the findings show a 
positive relationship between hot market conditions and underpricing, an important finding per se 
which duplicates evidence from other markets.  
Section 2 offers a review of the literature on underpricing. Section 3 describes the regulatory 
regime of the Athens Stock Exchange with regard to price variation limits. Section 4 discusses data, 
presents control variables and methodology. Section 5 presents empirical findings and section 6 
provides the discussion. We test the robustness of our results in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Empirical studies on early performance of initial public offerings 
The extensive literature on initial underpricing has looked at the factors that determine the 
degree of underpricing. Studies abound for many countries. Examples are: Finn and Higham (1988), 
                                                 
2
 For this reason, the sample of 351 IPO securities is examined in the aggregate as well as individually, according to the three sub-periods 
where significant institutional changes occurred regarding limits on the daily movement of share prices, so as to be compared to the IPOs 
initial returns taken in each period 
 5 
Lee et. al. (1996) and Loughran et al. (1994 updated 2011) for Australia
3
; Tian and Megginson (2007), 
for China;  Derrien and Womack (2003), Loughran et al, (1995) for France; Ljungqvist (1997) for 
Germany;  Hogholm and Rydqvist (1995), Rydqvist (1997), Ritter (2007) for Sweden
4
; Kiymaz (2000) 
for Turkey; Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) for Switzerland
5
, Loughran et al. (1995), Champers and 
Dimson (2009), Levis (2011) for United Kingdom, Gajewski and Gresse (2006) for Europe, Wu et al. 
(2007), Friesen and Swift (2009) and Ritter (2009) for USA.  
Derrien and Womack (2003) focus on the efficiency of the main process of going public in 
France under different market conditions and mechanisms. They show that the overall market 
momentum in the three months prior to an offering is a significant ex-ante predictor of the level of 
underpricing. In the sample of 264 French IPOs, the mean underpricing reached 13.2 percent. 
Loughran et al. (2011) adds to the previous evidence and shows that in a portfolio of 686 IPOs during 
the period from 1983-2006, a total initial return of 10.7 percent. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006), and Ritter (2009) provide evidence from 652 German IPOs coming to 
the market from 1978-2006. Underpricing related significantly to stock market conditions, 
macroeconomic conditions, insider retention rates and the inverse of real gross proceeds. Initial returns 
for this period of study is 26.9% and is significantly higher from a previous smaller sample of 189 
firms from 1970-1993, presented by Ljungqvist with underpricing of 10.5 percent.  
Champers and Dimson (2009) examine the performance of 7093 firms listed and traded on the 
London Stock Exchange during 1917-2007. The overall average first day returns reported is 13.32%
6
. 
UK listed IPOs show an increasing underpricing trend over the decades with the most recent 1109 
                                                 
3 Lee et. al. (1996) and Ritter (2007) provide an analysis on the initial underpricing of 1,103 Australian IPOs listed for a period of 30 
years. The findings indicate that for the period 1976-2006 the average initial returns have been 19.8%. The result is consistent with the 
view that unique institutional characteristics may have overwhelmed previous tests of equilibrium models of IPO underpricing.  
4 Hogholm and Rydqvist (1995), Rydqvist (1997), Ritter (2007) documents IPO underpricing for companies going public on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. The Swedish sample comprises 406 new firms listed during 1980-2006. The average underpricing for the 
Swedish IPOs is 27.3 percent. Hogholm and Rydqvist (1995) find a positive relationship between the level of underpricing and the level 
of ex-ante uncertainty.  
5
 In Switzerland for a sample of 42 stocks that were issued in the market between 1983 and 1989 Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) report a 
35.8 percent. The excess returns from offering price persist for at least three years, however if the purchase is made at the first day's 
closing price then the three year returns are negative.  
6 During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period 
from 1946 to 1986, and even more after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986 
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firms listed after 2000 and until 2009 presenting an initial return of 19.86%. Levis (1993), Levis and 
Thomas (1995) and Loughran et al (1995)  examine the performance of 3,986 firms listed and traded on 
the London Stock Exchange during 1959-2006. The overall average first day returns reported is 16.8%. 
The degree of underpricing related significantly only to the percentage of equity retained in the firm by 
the original entrepreneurs, the amount of new money raised on flotation and the presence of an 
earnings forecast.  
Ritter (2009) in a sample of 15,490 US IPOs, (issued between 1960-2006), reports that initial 
public offerings are significantly underpriced by 18.0 percent. He shows that the more established an 
issuer and hence the less investor uncertainty about the firm‟s real value, the lower the amount of 
underpricing. An important finding is that hot and cold performances come in waves and cold issue 
markets have average initial returns that are not necessarily positive. Wu et al. (2007) took a step 
further and classified US IPOs into global and domestic categories; they found  that US global IPOs 
significantly underperformed the market and US domestic listed firms. 
Jenkinson et al (2005) document that for a sample of 918 European and 3480 U.S. IPOs, 
European underpricing was on average 21.1 percent while the initial underpricing for the U.S. IPOs 
was 18.3 percent. A possible explanation for this evidence is that initial price ranges are based on less 
information in Europe than in the U.S. German firms present an unexpectedly high level of 
underpricing with 48.9 percent. With German firms excluded from the European sample, the average 
underpricing falls to 13.8 percent, significantly lower than the 18.3 percent observed in the U.S. 
Jenkinson et al present two interesting samples called “rest of West Europe” and “rest of East Europe”, 
with 75 and 29 IPOs respectively. West Europe IPOs have, on average, low underpricing with 15.1 
percent, while East Europe IPOs have marginally higher underpricing of 18.7 percent. 
In a rare study of trading halts and IPO performance Pettway and Kaneko (1996) examined IPO 
underpricing before and after a change in regulation in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They find that a 
relaxation of constraints which delayed the commencement of trading of newly listed shares led to less 
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severe underpricing. Hence, the conclusion was that regulations that delayed trading and price 
formation contributed to more severe underpricing.  
 
3. Price Limits at the Athens Stock Exchange  
3.1 Changing Restrictions on Daily Price Variation  
At various times restrictions on price variation have applied to early trading of IPO shares in the 
Athens Stock Exchange. Specifically, whereas until September 1993, price fluctuations in the Athens 
Stock Exchange were unconstrained for all shares, the Exchange imposed a limit on daily variation in 
October 1993. The purpose of this regulation was to protect investors and the market from „speculative 
attacks‟. Although the wording was vague the context was one of macroeconomic difficulties, 
exchange rate pressure and fears that the Greek market might experience a precipitous decline. 
However the daily limit imposed was not one-sided but affected upward prices changes, as well. In 
subsequent periods the limit continued to apply at times of rising market when a healthy supply of 
IPOs appeared.  
 The regulation applied to all stocks, including newly issued ones from their first day of trading. 
In particular, within any day a stock price could fluctuate within a range of ±8 percent. When a price 
reached the limit, it would freeze at that limit and no more trading could take place on the same day, 
except at (or of course within) the limit range. The stock would start trading again on the next day, its 
starting price being the limit price of the previous day. If the demand and supply continued to be high 
(or low) during the trading, then the stock locked again and trading of its shares transferred to the 
following day.   
Almost four years later, on December 1
st
, 1996, the regulation changed for newly trading stocks 
only. Specifically, prices of newly listed shares were allowed to fluctuate within a limit of ±99% for 
the first three days of trading (from the fourth day on, the limit of ±8% continued to apply). This 
regulation changed again on December 1
st
, 1999 when the stock price of an IPO company could 
fluctuate freely for the first three trading days. The rationale for these changes was one related to the 
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speed of price discovery. The Stock Exchange argued and the regulator (the Capital Market 
Commission) accepted that newly listed stocks, which were increasingly coming from the second-tier 
market, needed unrestricted early day trading, in order to achieve rapidly their short – term 
equilibrium.  
During the period under examination 351 IPOs were launched in the Greek market. The 
discrete changes in regulation of price fluctuation allow us to divide our sample of 351 IPOs into four 
sub-periods. The first sub-period is from 1
st
 January 1990 to 30
th 
September 1993 when there were no 
limits during the first three days of trading. From 1
st
 October 1993 to 30
th
 November 1996, the daily 
limit of ±8% was imposed on the price fluctuation of all IPOs listed in ASE. The third period is from 
1
st
 December 1996 to 30
th
 November 1999, with a daily limit of ±99% (initial three days of trading) for 
all IPOs going public. Finally the fourth period stands from 1
st
 December 1999 to 31
st
 December 2011 
when no limits during the first three days of trading were re-established. From a regulatory standpoint 
the first and last subperiods belong to the „no limits‟ category. 
 
3.2 The effect of regulatory constraints: basic hypothesis 
 
We first consider how the variation limit works in the secondary market and how returns can 
compare between the constrained and unconstrained cases.  
 
Letting, 
CP(t)       be the unconstrained closing price on day t 
CPL(t)    be the constrained closing price on day t 
OP          be the offer price 
y            be the daily variation limit (in percent) 
u(t)        be the percent underpricing on day t 
A newly listed share trading for its first day will reach an unconstrained closing price if no 
variation limits apply. Then, denoting with * the unconstrained first day equilibrium, 
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                        u*(1) = {CP*(1)  -  OP}/OP                                                                       (1) 
 
If a variation limit is in force however, the first day closing price may either settle at an 
unconstrained level within the limit, or it may hit the limit and stop there until the next day.  
If the variation limit is effective on the first and the subsequent t days but becomes non-binding 
on trading day (t+1), then the price finally equilibrates on day (t+1) and becomes CPL*(t+1).   
Assuming momentarily that there is no other market variation over the interval (1, t+1), the null 
hypothesis is that the variation limit has no effect on the ultimate equilibrating price and therefore, 
 
                                                    CPL*(t+1) = CP*(1)                                                                 (2). 
In this case the regulatory variation limit is irrelevant to initial underpricing, so that 
 
                     u*(1)  [without constraint]  =  u(t+1)   [with constraint]                        (3). 
The actual effect of the limit is only to delay the establishment of (short – term) equilibrium but 
not to modify the initial underpricing. In this case, what should hold empirically is that first – day 
returns will be higher when unconstrained. However, the comparison of (t+1) st day returns in the 
constrained case to first day returns in the unconstrained case should exhibit no significant difference, 
ceteris paribus.  
One could argue that since newly listed stocks are associated with a high order of uncertainty, 
an initial trading period without variation limits would be desirable since it would facilitate more rapid 
price discovery. This was in fact the rationale used by Greek regulators when in 1996 they relaxed the 
prior regime of  variation limits (±8%) and allowed a three day period after listing with very wide 
limits (± 99%), relaxing even this restriction later by eliminating the limit altogether.  
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We formulate a competing hypothesis: an administrative restriction on daily variation will alter 
the pattern of possible excess returns in early trading and impose a „cooling off‟ effect so that 
underpricing will be moderated. This competing hypothesis would imply that:  
                              
                     u*(1)  [without constraint]  >  u (t+1)   [with constraint]                     (4).  
The voluminous literature on short – term underpricing proves that early trading returns on 
newly listed shares are normally excessive and are also affected by early investor sentiment, [Omran 
(2005), Baker and Wurgler [(2006), (2007)], Campbell et al. (2009)].  Furthermore, some theorists, 
notably Ljungquist et al. (2006) and Cornelli et al. (2006), have proposed that initial underpricing can 
be seen as a strategy on the part of issuers and underwriters to appropriate „hot‟ investor sentiment, in 
the short-run. Other studies following behavioral premises suggest that precisely because of the lack of 
sufficient information, reputation and history, early post – offering prices are not efficient because they 
are more prone to strong investor sentiment. In fact, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that higher 
information asymmetry intensifies the appearance of investor sentiment. Campbell et al. (2009) offer 
empirical verification of this assertion for the case of IPO stocks. 
If early investor sentiment, whether spontaneous or managed by underwriters, is responsible for 
underpricing then it is plausible that its manifestation will be hampered by limits on price variation.  
As a result, the attractiveness of underpriced issues to short-term investors will be tempered; In line 
with arguments presented in Boehme and Colak (2012) the clientele of IPO shares may then shift away 
from short-term speculators. As the prospect of rapid price increases is reduced, issuers and 
underwriters will also have reduced incentives to underprice and will bring offering prices closer to 
intrinsic values,  
It is therefore plausible to hypothesize that daily variation limits will reduce underpricing by 
incentivizing underwriters to price closer to the efficient valuation, and by moderating an investor rush 
 11 
for the new issues by the same token.  In this case, early excess returns would be moderated under 
constraint.  
The hypothesis we test with Greek IPO data is therefore a verification of inequality (4). 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1The Data on Greek IPOs 
 This study examines the initial performance of 351 IPOs listed in the Athens Stock Exchange 
in Main, Parallel and New boards during the period from January 1990 through to December 2011
10
. 
The sample contains only ordinary common stocks; It excludes the issue of preference stock as well as 
transfers from the Parallel to the Main market. The study extracts data mainly from IPOs prospectuses, 
but also daily press, ASE reports (History of ASE, Fact Books, Annual and Monthly Statistical 
Bulletins) and Annual Reports of the Hellenic Capital Commission.
7
 The prospectuses were referenced 
from the library and website of the ASE and the Capital Market Commission market resource centre.  
Prospectuses provide data for each of the issues regarding the offer price, total gross proceeds, 
age of companies, proportion of shares sold by owners, list of underwriters, and closing date of the 
offer. Other additional information about the companies comes from databases available at Compustat, 
Datastream and Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation, at the public libraries of ASE and the 
Capital Market Commission, the library of the Bank of Greece, and the database of the Greek 
Parliament. In a few cases, we approached companies directly. 
Table 1 provides categorisation of the IPOs, into the three market boards of Greece (Main, 
Parallel and New). The highest number of IPOs was launched in 2000 with 53 cases (18 in the Main 
market and 35 in the Parallel market), followed by 46 IPOs in 1994
8
 (36 in the Main market and 10 in 
                                                 
7
Prices of the stocks and General Index of Athens Stock Exchange were collected at predetermined times during the first 
year of trading.  
8
 During this year, many construction companies were listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. 
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the Parallel market). The lowest number of IPOs registered in 2008 and 2009 (1 IPO in the Main 
market correspondingly).  
 
TABLE 1. Greek IPO sample description 
Event Year IPO firms full 
sample 
Main Market Parallel Market New Market Total Capital 
Raised „000 Euros 
1990 28 23 5 - 108,418 
1991 14 11 3 - 124,191 
1992 5 5 - - 26.560 
1993 10 10 - - 60,983 
1994 46 36 10 - 263,360 
1995 20 10 10 - 70,003 
1996 20 7 13 - 336,562 
1997 12 3 9 - 50,743 
1998 23 10 13 - 924,061 
1999 38 15 23 - 1,182,523 
2000 53 18 35 - 2,842,882 
2001 21 13 6 2 1,497,054 
2002 21 8 10 4 99,712 
2003 15 1 12 2 121,332 
2004 11 4 4 3 87,126 
2005 7 3 3 1 81,860 
2006 2 2 - - 725,248 
2007 3 3 - - 500,733 
2008 1 1 - - 23,337 
2009 1 1 - - 10,000 
2010 0 - - - - 
2011 0 - - - - 
      
Total 351 184 156 12 8,791,468 
Note: This table provides the number of IPOs listed in each market (main, parallel, new) in every calendar year. 
It contains further details on the total annual capital raised by IPOs.  
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
We measure the level of initial returns of IPOs listed on the ASE using the conventional 
method, with the raw initial return (RIR)
9
 on the first day of trading calculated as follows: 
0,
0,1,
i
ii
i
OP
OPCP
RIR

 (6) 
                                                 
9
 The raw initial return RIR can be considered a measure of underpricing, assuming that the normal return under efficiency 
would be 0 and that the equity risk is equivalent to the market risk. Other methods relax these assumptions and adjust raw 
returns. 
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As time lag between the offer price closing day and the first day of trading in the stock 
exchange is significant in the Athens market, the initial return is adjusted for market changes, taking 
into account movements of the Athens Stock Exchange General Index (ASEGI)
10
 between the offer 
price closing date and the end of the first day of trading. During this period, many changes may occur 
in market conditions causing deviations in the observed premium measured in equation one. As a result 
the initial return measured may be an outcome of changes in market conditions.
11
   
Calculations of the market-adjusted initial return are as follows: 
0,
0,1,
0,
0,1,
I
Ii
i
ii
i
MI
MIMI
OP
OPCP
MAIR



 12
 
(7) 
The dependent variable for the tests is the one-day market-adjusted return of the first day of listing, or, 
in the case of effective price cap, the return over the days until equilibrium price is first observed.  
In the case of periods when variation limits were in force, the first day market adjusted return is 
a curtailed measure of actual return, whenever the variation limit becomes effective. We use the 
following procedure to compute the imputed return for the first day: returns of the second day are 
added to first day returns if these are bounded by the day limit. If second day returns are also bounded 
by the daily limit, returns of the third day are added. The process goes on until the day when the price 
is formed within the variation limit, i.e. remains unconstrained. Thus, if in the case of a new listing 
when the 8% limit was in force, the first day return was unconstrained, say 7.5 %, it is so recorded. If 
however the first day return is constrained at 8%, we add on the second day return. If this is 
unconstrained, say 6.5 %, then a total imputed first day return of 14.5 % is recorded. If however the 
second day return is also constrained, we add on the return of the third day. If this is unconstrained, say 
                                                 
10
 For this study, the ASE General Index (ASEGI) is used as a market benchmark. The ASEGI is the main index and is 
recognised as the overall indicator of market performance in Greece. It consists of a number of representative shares from 
various sectors in the main board, which make a consistent portion of the total ASE market capitalisation. 
11
 These calculations are appropriate because the equilibrium prices of stock exchange reflect not only the companies‟ 
special characteristics but also, during the formation process, by the ascending and descending of capital market.  
12 RIRi,t= Raw Initial Return of company „i‟ at period t, MAIRi,t=Market Adjusted (excess) Initial Return of company „i‟ at 
period t, OPi,0=IPO offer price as per prospectus of company „i‟, CPi,1=Closing price of IPO of company „i‟ at the end of the 
first trading day, MIi,0=ASE General Index at the date of prospectus publication for company „i‟, MIi,1=ASE General Index 
at the close of first trading day of company „i‟. 
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5.5 % then an imputed return of 21.5% is recorded. If the third day return is also constrained, we 
continue to the fourth day return, and so forth.   
Hence, in order to find out the equilibrium (the trading price matching the offer and the demand 
for the shares after the IPO in cases of price cap)
 13
 , we calculated – for each offering listed in the ASE 
during the two sub-periods (October 1993-November 1996, and December 1996-November 1999) the 
return accumulated over the number of consecutive days when the price cap was effective and that first 
day when it was not effective (adjusted with the general index). Thus, if the share price movements 
trigger the price cap on the four consecutive days after listing and do not trigger the price cap on day 5 
in the aftermarket, calculations for the underpricing level are as follows:  
0,
0,1,
i
ii
i
OP
OPEP
RAU

   (8)                       
0,
0,5,
0,
0,5,
5,
I
II
i
ii
i
MI
MIMI
OP
OPEP
MAU



      (9)14 
Thus, the calculations produced two estimations of the dependent variable. The first is the 
actual first-day, market-adjusted initial return, irrespective of whether it is constrained or 
unconstrained (MAIR). The second is the imputed first day return after successive returns 
circumscribed the constraints (MAU). In effect, this is a measure of market adjusted underpricing. 
 
In Figure 1, we show the number of IPOs and the movement of the Greek Market Index.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                        Please Insert Figure 1 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The Figure testifies to the fact the IPOs are quite distributed overtime and do not seem to relate 
very closely to market movements, although they do fall off after 2005, after the protracted period of 
market declines.  
                                                 
13
 Gajeski and Gresse (2006) report that the main problem is the choice of the equilibrium price. When the market is 
sufficiently liquid, equilibrium price generally corresponds to the first-day closing price. In other cases, the equilibrium 
may be obtained a couple of days after the IPO.  
14
 Where RAU= Raw underpricing, MAU= Market adjusted underpricing, OPi,0=IPO offer price as per prospectus of 
company „i‟, EPi,5=Equilibrium price (Closing price of IPO of company „i‟ at the end of the fifth trading day), MI i,0=ASE 
General Index at the date of prospectus company „i‟, MIi,5=ASE General Index at the close of fifth trading day of company 
„i‟. 
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In Figure 2, we show the Raw (RAU) and the Market-adjusted (MAU) returns for IPOs 
performed each quarterly period.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            Please Insert Figure 2 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The most visible aspect is the great peak in returns during the last two quarters of 1999, a time 
when the Greek market achieved all time highs in August and September 1999. Although market 
declines set in during the last quarter of that year, IPO activity and strong underpricing continued until 
the end of that year. We shall later check for the effect of outliers to be found in these two quarters, on 
our regression results.  
 
4.3 Descriptive Results 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of raw and market adjusted initial returns. It also shows the 
average number of days for initial prices to reach equilibrium during periods of active variation limits.  
Specifically Panel A of Table 2 shows the mean (median) unadjusted and market adjusted initial 
returns for each of the three regulatory sub-periods. The mean unadjusted return at the end of the first 
trading day, when no ceiling restriction was present, is 48.50 percent. The market adjusted return in the 
same period is 48.90 percent.  During the period with the cap of ±8 percent the mean initial unadjusted 
is 5.63 percent whereas market adjusted initial return has a mean of 4.94 percent. Finally during the 
period with a cap of ±99 percent, the mean unadjusted return is 70.15 percent and the market adjusted 
return is 68.98 percent.  
           A similar pattern of mean returns appears in Panel B where estimates are made of MAU, the 
initial return after the market reaches equilibrium. The returns of the unconstrained period are of 
course the same as in panel A and the returns of the periods with constraints become higher, as we 
would expect. What is notable is that whereas average returns of the period with the 8 percent cap are 
lower than those of the unconstrained period, the returns of the period with the 99 percent cap are  
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  TABLE 2. Distribution of Raw and Market Adjusted Initial Returns 
Panel A: Division of the sample into four periods based on regulation changes of the IPOs initial day performance 
 Period No of IPOs Mean (med) of RIR (%) Mean (median) of 
MAIR (%) 
No ceiling Jan 1990 – Dec2011 191  43.74 (12.47) 44.10 (16.23) 
 Jan 1990 – Sep 1993 47 56.00 (33.39) 52.15 (36.49) 
 Dec 1999 - Dec 2011 144 40.55 (10.32) 41.86 (12.64) 
±8% Cap Oct 1993 - Nov 1996 93 5.63 (8.00) 4.94 (11.72) 
±99% Cap Dec 1996 - Nov 1999 67 70.15 (85.90) 68.98 (70.22) 
Overall Jan 1990 – Dec 2011 351 37.82 (8.00)  36.55 (11.64) 
Panel B: Division of the sample into three periods based on regulation of daily variation  
 Period No of IPOs Mean (medina) of  
RU (%) 
Mean (median) of 
MAU (%) 
No ceiling Jan 1990 – Dec2011 191 
 
 43.18 (12.10) 43.51 (16.23) 
 Jan 1990 – Sep 1993 47 56.00 (33.39) 52.15 (36.49) 
 Dec 1999 - Dec 2011 144 40.55 (10.32) 41.86 (12.64) 
±8% Cap Oct 1993 - Nov 1996 93 26.22 (16.84) 29.62 (23.48) 
±99% Cap Dec 1996 - Nov 1999 67 112.88 (84.57) 105.66 (70.80) 
Overall Jan 1990 – Dec 2011 351 52.48 (22.51) 52. (24.27) 
     
Panel C: Maximum and Minimum value of IPO initial day performance and Underpricing  
 No of IPOs Max (min) of RU (%) Max (min) of MAIR (%) Max (min) of MAU  
No ceiling 191  472.24 (-76.67) 472.34 (-67.35) 472.34 (-67.35) 
±8% Cap 93 133.17 (-8.00) 22.25 (-17.30) 120.82 (-17.30) 
±99% Cap 67 751.07 (-4.54) 118.73 (-41.84) 748.00 (-41.84) 
     
Overall 351 751.07 (-76.67) 472.34 (-67.35)  748.00 (-41.84) 
Panel D: Number of days that the prices of IPOs reached their upper price cap (limit up) during their listing in ASE 
 Period with price cap: ±8% Period with price cap: ±99% 
Mean 2.59 0.67 
Median 2.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation 2.80 0.88 
Minimum no of limit ups 0.00 0.00 
Maximum no of consecutive „limit ups‟ 11 3 
Max no of consecutive „limit downs‟ 1 0 
Notes: The raw initial return (RIR) measures the returns at the end of the first day of trading whilst the market adjusted initial return (MAIR) adjusts for 
the general index. The raw initial return is calculated by RIRi,t=(CPi,1-OPi,0)/OPi,0. The raw initial return (RIR) is adjusted for market changes taking into 
account the Athens Stock Exchange General Index (ASEGI) between the offer price closing date and the end of first day of trading. This is calculated as 
MAIRi,t=[(CPi,1-OPi,0)/Pi,0-(Mi,1-Mi,0/Mi,0)]. Panel A shows the initial returns in the end of the first day of trading. Panel B shows the level of underpricing 
(equilibrium or fair market price) which considers 2nd, 3rd etc days of trading until the IPO will reach its equilibrium. The raw underpricing (returns reach 
their equilibrium price in more than one day of trading in the cases of price cap) is measured as RUi,t=(EPi,1-OPi,0)/OPi,0. The Market Adjusted 
Underpricing (MAU) is calculated as MAU=[(EPi,5-OPi,0)/OPi,0-(MIi,5-MIi,0/Mi,0)]. Panel C focuses on the daily limit hits of price cap periods. Overall our 
sample is divided into three periods. These periods are from January 1990–December 1992 (trading without limits), January 1993–November 1996 (cap of 
±8%), December 1996–November 1999 (cap of ±99%) and finally from December 1999–December 2011 (trading without limits). 
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much higher than all others. This difference is attributable to the fact that within the period with the 99 
percent cap are „hot‟ quarters with the highest returns ever observed in the Greek market. This of 
course will be clearer when we apply our control variables in the multiple regressions that follow. 
During the sub-period where the daily limit on stock price movement was ±8 percent the mean 
number of successive days with limit hits was 2.59 (Panel D of Table 2). In other words, the daily price 
movement of 93 IPOs listed in the ASE during the period October 1993–November 1996 reached their 
equilibrium price after 2.59 trading days on average. It is worth noting that only 19 out of 93 IPOs of 
this period did not reach the limit on the first trading day. On the other hand, two IPOs recorded their 
equilibrium after 11 and 10 trading days respectively 
           In the period where the daily limit was ±99 percent, the mean number of days of limit hits was 
0.67. Thus, on average IPO returns reached equilibrium within the first trading day. Thirty-seven out 
of sixty-seven IPOs never hit the limit whereas 30 out of 67 IPOs did hit the daily upper limit at least 
one time and the shares in four IPOs rose by 99 percent for three consecutive days.  
 
4.4. Control Variables 
We define two binary dummy variables, one for each of the two periods with regulatory daily price 
caps. Thus, CAP99 represents all periods when a daily variation limit of 99 percent held for the first 
three days of trading; and CAP8 represents periods with the 8 percent limit on daily variarion. Our 
basic hypothesis is that the stricter the limit the lower the short – term underpricing.  
We next turn to market conditions, especially as our period contains alternations of hot and 
cold periods.  Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004)
15
 report that underpricing increases substantially 
during the hot market period and then falls in the cold market to levels observed in the eighties and the 
early nineties. Lowry and Schwert (2002), Benveniste et al. (2003) and Derrien and Womack (2003) 
suggest after measuring the relationship of the initial return with the market movements, that 
                                                 
15
 Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004) reveal that underwriters allocate hot IPOs to investors in return for commission business and they 
receive greater profits from commission business when there is greater underpricing. 
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companies should choose the cold issue market to go public so that they can gain from higher prices of 
hot periods.  
The selection of „hot period‟ is an important issue. Market conditions per calendar quarter have 
a double criterion: on one hand, the number of IPOs performed during the quarter and on the other 
hand, ex-post market returns of the quarter. The use of these two variables  is an extended version of 
the methodology used by Yung et al. (2008) and Boehme and Colak (2012). The two continuous 
variables capture respectively entrepreneur sentiment and investor sentiment. The first is (NUIPO) and 
represents the ratio of the number of IPOs in each quarter to the quarterly average of IPOs in the whole 
sample. The second is (RET) and represents the ratio of each quarter‟s market return to the overall 
average quarterly return over the period covered by our sample.  
Compared to previously used methodology, this includes two rather than one „hot market 
variables‟ and these are continuous rather than dummies. In this manner the study could capture more 
accurately market sentiment on both sides of the market.   
We hypothesize that IPO underpricing is positively related to both the relative levels of supply 
of IPOs and of market returns.  
 
Research methodology must control for many other factors in order to make these comparisons 
effective in a cross-sectional model. The study, therefore, uses a series of control variables, inspired 
from the literature. These control variables are: listing board classification (LBC), age of the firm at the 
date it goes public (AGE), time lag (TLAG), privatization (PRIV), company size (SIZE), demand 
multiple (OVER), underwriters‟ reputation (UR), retained ownership (OWN) and industry type (IND).. 
Appendix A summarizes the explanatory variables, briefly giving their definition and measurements:  
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Listing Board Classification
16
: Following Gajewski and Gresse (2006) we distinguish firms listed in 
the Main board from those listed in the „parallel‟ market. The variable takes a value of 1 for the Main 
Board listings. 
Age: Age represents the number of years of operating history of a firm prior to going public and it 
creates a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty. Following Ritter (1984), Lee et al. (1996) and Kiymaz (2000) 
we use this variable  
Time Lag:  The period between the official date of the prospectus announcement (or offer price date) 
and the listing date of an IPO, is usually short; however in Greece, this time lag varies between five 
and seventy days. During the intervening period, changes in market conditions may affect the price 
performance of the IPOs. ( Loughran et al (1995) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996)). 
Privatization:  Privatization is the transfer of ownership from state owned enterprises to private 
investors through IPOs. Following Perotti and Guney (1993) Jones et. al (1999) and Megginson et al. 
(2000) we attach a value of 1 to IPOs of privatizing public firms.  
SIZE: IPO Size is the magnitude of the offering, measured as the product of the offering price and the 
number of shares being offered. Zarowin (1990) and  Kiymaz (2000) document that if smaller firms 
tend, on average, to be more risky, then first day returns are expected to be bearish related to firm size.  
Demand Multiple: Oversubscription occurs when demand for shares exceeds the supply of shares 
offered for sale. As a result, the underwriters or investment bankers must allocate the shares among 
investors. Keloharju (1993) reports that a higher demand multiple reflects the greater absorption 
capacity of the market.  
Underwriter reputation:  The lead underwriter plays an important role in pricing and distributing an 
IPO, certifying the quality of the issue by their past performance in IPO underwriting. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), Spiess and Pettway (1997), Carter et al (1998), Kim and 
                                                 
16
 The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) consists of three markets, the Main, the Parallel and the New markets. The „Main‟ 
market is the oldest one, dating back to the foundation years of the Athens Stock Exchange in 1879, whereas the „Parallel‟ 
market was formed in 1990 and the „New‟ market in 2001. The variable is measured with dummy variables which gets the 
value of „1‟ if an IPOs is listed in main market and „0‟ if it goes public to secondary or main market. 
 20 
Ritter (1999), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) and Chua-Booth (2004) specify that prestigious 
underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings and lower initial returns expected from IPOs 
underwritten by reputable banks. In the Greek case we use the dummy variable with value 1 for all 
IPOs undertaken by underwriter banks, as opposed to other investment firms. 
Given Ownership:  This is the percentage of ownership sold by pre-IPO shareholders. By selling a 
small percentage of their firm, original owners may signal firm quality (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)).  
Industry classification: IPOs are classified in groups based on their sector. Gajewski and Gresse 
(2006) use industry as a variable that affects the average initial under pricing. Spiess and Pettway 
(1995) working on a sample of industrial firms find that initial underpricing is significantly lower
17
. 
Our dummy variable takes the value 1 for the industrial sectors. 
 
 
The regression model is specified as follows: 
 
MAU or (MAIR) = a0 + γ1 LBC1 + γ2 AGE1 + γ3 TLAG1 + γ4 PRIV1 + γ5 SIZE1 + γ6 OVER1 + γ7 UR1 + γ8 RET 
+ γ9NUIPO +γ10 OWN1 + γ11 IND1 + γ12 CAP8 + γ13 CAP99} +εi                                                   (10). 
 
 
 
If the regulatory constraints effectively lower underpricing, we expect to find that, 
 
                                               γ12 < γ13 < 0                        (11) 
 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
In Table 3 we show the result of tests of regression (10) using MAIR as the dependent variable.   
Our first observation on the findings in Table 3 (columns 1-5) is that of all the control variables one 
comes out very consistently significant. This is the demand multiple (DM), which exerts a strong 
positive influence on one-day returns of IPO listings. This finding is as expected, testifying to high first 
                                                 
17
 This research defined as „industrial‟ IPOs those firms which belong to Chemical, Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & 
Shipyards sub-sectors and attached to them a value of one. Those not industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Real Estate/Property, 
Transportation, Tourism/Hotels etc and get the value of zero. 
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day returns under higher demand pressure. Of the remaining control variables, size acquires a 
significant negative coefficient in two cases, the industry dummy picks up a marginally significant 
effect in two regressions. All the effects of these variables are in the expected direction, so that there is 
no departure from previous empirical evidence.  
   TABLE 3. Results of regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAIR as dependent variable for 351 
IPOs listed on ASE over the 1990-2011 period (end of 1
st
 day of trading) 
VARIABLES  (1)  MAIR (2) MAIR 
IPOs listed with ±8% 
(3)  MAIR IPOs listed 
with ±8%, ±99% 
Constant -33.33 63.10* 66.59* 
 (0.314) (0.0844) (0.0713) 
LBC -3.906 9.307 8.864 
 (0.516) (0.130) (0.147) 
AGE 0.0950 4.140 4.459 
 (0.980) (0.276) (0.246) 
TLAG -0.267 -0.0996 -0.0217 
 (0.209) (0.601) (0.913) 
PRIV -10.62 -8.481 -8.059 
 (0.400) (0.475) (0.501) 
SIZE 3.909* -4.678* -4.894** 
 (0.093) (0.0563) (0.0478) 
OVER 0.261*** 0.220*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0083) 
UND -2.958 5.294 11.80* 
 (0.656) (0.404) (0.0720) 
RET 1.048 0.778 1.023 
 (0.240) (0.370) (0.242) 
NUIPO 2.620 10.36** 9.365** 
 (0.495) (0.0105) (0.0188) 
GO -0.0204 0.461 0.473 
 (0.939) (0.115) (0.111) 
IND 13.30* 10.14 10.23 
 (0.0962) (0.178) (0.171) 
PC8  -50.23*** -56.54*** 
  (0) (1.11e-09) 
PC99   -16.18 
   (0.114) 
    
Observations 351 351 351 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.290 0.361 0.364 
    Notes: MAIR=[(CPi,1-OPi,0)/Pi,0-(Mi,1-Mi,0/Mi,0)] where MAIR is market adjusted initial returns (2) LBC, Listing Board Classification which gets the 
value „1‟ if listed in „main market‟, „0‟ if listed in „parallel market‟ and „new market‟ (3) AGE,  Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total of one plus the age of 
the company in years on the listing date, (4) TLAG, Time lag between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of trading, (5) PRIV, 
privatised firms gets the value „1‟ otherwise „0‟, (6) Size - market capitalization, i.e. log of the total number of outstanding shares after the IPO 
multiplied by price per share,  (7) DM, demand multiple for firm i, (8) UR, Underwriters reputation which gets the value „1‟ for banking underwriters 
and „0‟ for others, (9) RET, is defined as quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average, (10) NUIPO, is a state of supply 
variable defined as quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average number of IPOs in each quarter , (11) OWN, proportion of given ownership during 
the going public process, (12) IND, identify the sector of IPOs. Industrial are classified those firms which belong in Chemicals, Industrial (pure), 
Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards sub-sectors. Non industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real Estate/Property, Transportation, 
Tourism/Hotels etc *, **, *** indicate the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
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The findings on the variables describing market condition are remarkable. Relative market 
return (RET) shows a positive influence in two regressions and relative intensity of IPO supply 
(NUIPO) is positive and significant in two cases. Thus, it is clear that hot market conditions act to 
intensify underpricing in this sample.  
The findings on the regulatory dummy variables are as follows:  The returns in the period with 
the 99 percent variation limit do not appear to be significantly different from others, as the dummy 
variable representing this regulatory period picks up no significant effect.  However, returns observed 
under the 8 percent constraint appear, ceteris paribus, significantly lower than in other periods. These 
findings are perfectly plausible, since first-day returns under a tight constraint are truncated returns 
corresponding to the constraint, and thus are lower than in periods with looser constraints or with no 
constraint at all.  
In Table 4 we test equation (10) with the main variant of the dependent variable. The layout of 
independent variables is the same as in Table 3. The dependent variable is MAU, which measures the 
returns up to the first day of price formation without the interference of the variation limit, i.e. the first 
short-term equilibrium price. In the case of periods with no variation limits, MAU is of course identical 
to MAIR.  
The performance of control variables shown in Table 4 is similar to that found earlier with 
MAIR, but there are differences as well. The single most importantly determinant of underpricing 
remains the demand multiple (DM) variable. The time lag variable shows a significant positive effect 
on MAU and the relative quarterly performance of the market variable (RET) picks up a positive 
effect. The dummy variable representing industrial grouping appears with a positive contribution also, 
but with marginal significance.  
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     TABLE 4. Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAU as dependent 
variable for 351 IPOs listed on ASE over the 1990-2011 period (end of 2
nd
, 3
rd…11th day of trading for 
price cap period) 
VARIABLES  (1) - MAU  (2) MAU 
IPOs listed with ±8% 
(3)  MAU IPOs listed 
with ±8%, ±99% 
Constant -47.07 10.21 12.59 
 (0.440) (0.870) (0.840) 
    
LBC -9.409 -1.560 -1.862 
 (0.278) (0.858) (0.830) 
AGE -8.015 -5.612 -5.395 
 (0.204) (0.371) (0.390) 
TLAG 0.525 0.624 0.677 
 (0.400) (0.317) (0.287) 
PRIV -6.399 -5.131 -4.844 
 (0.605) (0.674) (0.691) 
SIZE 4.140 -0.605 -0.752 
 (0.272) (0.878) (0.849) 
OVER 0.444*** 0.420*** 0.431*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) 
UND 12.49 17.39** 21.82** 
 (0.144) (0.045) (0.013) 
RET 1.792* 1.731* 1.598 
 (0.084) (0.094) (0.132) 
NUIPO -2.163 2.434 1.756 
 (0.629) (0.606) (0.710) 
GO 0.110 0.396 0.404 
 (0.797) (0.365) (0.362) 
IND 17.67* 15.79 15.86 
 (0.098) (0.142) (0.138) 
PC8  -29.84*** -34.14*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) 
PC99   -11.03 
   (0.370) 
    
Observations 351 351 351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.391 0.401 0.400 
    Notes:(1) MAU=[(EPi,5-OPi,0)/OPi,0-(MIi,5-MIi,0/Mi,0)] where MAU = Market Adjusted Underpricing (2) LBC, Listing Board Classification which gets 
the value „1‟ if listed in „main market‟, „0‟ if listed in „parallel market‟ and „new market‟ (3) AGE,  Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total of one plus the 
age of the company in years on the listing date, (4) TLAG, Time lag between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of trading, (5) 
PRIV, privatised firms gets the value „1‟ otherwise „0‟, (6) Size - market capitalization, i.e. log of the total number of outstanding shares after the IPO 
multiplied by price per share,  (7) DM, demand multiple for firm i, (8) UR, Underwriters reputation which gets the value „1‟ for banking underwriters 
and „0‟ for others, (9) RET, is defined as quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average, (10)NUIPO, is a state of supply variable 
defined as quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average number of IPOs in each quarter,  (11) OWN, proportion of given ownership during the going 
public process, (12) IND, identify the sector of IPOs. Industrial are classified those firms which belong in Chemicals, Industrial (pure), 
Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards sub-sectors. Non industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real Estate/Property, Transportation, 
Tourism/Hotels etc *, **, *** indicate the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.  
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The regulatory dummies are the central element of our hypothesis here. If regulatory 
constraints are irrelevant at equilibrium, the regulatory dummies should not affect MAU significantly. 
Our findings in Table 4 reject the null hypothesis. In both regressions where a dummy variable for the 
period under the tight constraint of (±8 percent) is used, it picks up a very significant negative effect.  
Thus, even when we consider more days until the equilibrium price is reached there are strong 
differences in the level of underpricing among the IPOs conducted under a tight constraint on daily 
variation.  
Unambiguously, the regulatory constraint lowers underpricing, ceteris paribus. Hence, the 
results point to the partial verification of (11). At the same time, the findings of Table 4 do not indicate 
that the variation limit of ±99 percent exerted any influence on underpricing. This is a plausible result 
since the majority of IPOs performed during the period when this wider limit was applied did not face 
an active constraint on their price during the first day of trading. Hence, that wider variation limit was 
not binding, and in any case it did not differentiate short-term equilibrium returns from those of the 
unconstrained period, significantly.  
In Table 5, we test the model of underpricing, on subsamples defined by the different 
regulatory constraints. The purpose of these tests is to see whether control variables perform 
differently in the different sub-periods, where this difference could have been masked by the pooled 
estimations over the whole sample. 
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TABLE 5. Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAU as 
dependent variable for IPOs listed with ±8% ±99% and without ceiling during 1990-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes:(1)MAU=[(EPi,5-OPi,0)/OPi,0-(MIi,5-MIi,0/Mi,0)] where MAU = Market Adjusted Underpricing (2) LBC, Listing Board Classification which 
gets the value „1‟ if listed in „main market‟, „0‟ if listed in „parallel market‟ and „new market‟ (3) AGE,  Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total of one plus 
the age of the company in years on the listing date, (4) TLAG, Time lag between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of 
trading, (5) PRIV, privatised firms gets the value „1‟ otherwise „0‟, (6) Size - market capitalization, i.e. log of the total number of outstanding shares 
after the IPO multiplied by price per share,  (7) DM, demand multiple for firm i, (8) UR, Underwriters reputation which gets the value „1‟ for 
banking underwriters and „0‟ for others, (9) RET, is defined as quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average, (10)NUIPO, is a 
state of supply variable defined as quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average number of IPOs in each quarter,  (11) OWN, proportion of given 
ownership during the going public process, (12) IND, identify the sector of IPOs. Industrial are classified those firms which belong in Chemicals, 
Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards sub-sectors. Non industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real 
Estate/Property, Transportation, Tourism/Hotels etc *, **, *** indicate the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.  
 
Specifications 
(1) MAU for IPOs 
listed with ±8% 
(2) MAU for 
IPOs listed 
with ±99% 
(3) MAU for 
IPOs without  
ceiling  
(4) Comparison of vector 
coefficients between 
regressions of ±8% and 
without ceiling 
Constant 32.52 -64.86 180.3***  
LBC  -11.30 28.12 24.63*** F(  1,   254) =    3.70 
 (0.199) (0.442) (0.009) Prob > F =  0.0554 
AGE  
4.972 -57.43** 11.16* F(  1,   254) =    0.23 
 (0.189) (0.0283) (0.080) Prob > F =    0.6311 
Time Lag  -0.347 3.049* 0.166 F(  1,   254) =    0.73 
 (0.122) (0.0959) (0.686) Prob > F =    0.3940 
PRIV -8.983 -31.12 -9.588 F(  1,   254) =    0.00 
 (0.292) (0.356) (0.557) Prob > F =    0.9510 
SIZE  -0.514 4.344 -16.16*** F(  1,   254) =    3.26 
 (0.872) (0.705) (0.0004) Prob > F =    0.0720 
DM  0.205*** 0.527*** 0.297*** F(  1,   254) =    0.94 
 (0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0005) Prob > F =    0.3331 
UR 3.900 -4.648 28.50* F(  1,   254) =    2.57 
 (0.465) (0.835) (0.083) Prob > F =    0.1104 
RET -1.483 -1.679 1.407 F(  1,   254) =    0.56 
 (0.363) (0.723) (0.191) Prob > F =    0.4561 
NUIPO -5.722 65.13 17.72*** F(  1,   254) =    8.77 
 (0.091)* (0.206) (0.006) Prob > F =    0.0034 
OWN 0.256 -1.687 1.624** F(  1,   254) =    2.83 
 (0.282) (0.260) (0.011) Prob > F =    0.0936 
IND 8.127 26.62 15.98 F(  1,   254) =    0.04 
 (0.441) (0.442) (0.106) Prob > F =    0.8471 
     
 
    
Adj. R2 0.359 0.469 0.417  
F-statistic 5.58 5.60 13.43  
No. of IPOs 93 67 193  
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The results are of some interest and support several observations. The first is that 
oversubscription exercises a strong influence on underpricing across all periods, and represents 
an unambiguous factor. The second observation is that there are no reversals of sign in any 
variable except one case: the relative number of IPOs per quarter. In the period with the strictest 
cap, this variable obtains a negative coefficient, whereas in the unregulated period the coefficient 
is positive. This implies that under a strict variation limit, IPOs are priced more fairly at times 
when supply of IPOs is more intensely competitive. In the absence of a variation limit, higher 
IPO frequency implies on the contrary that underpricing is more severe. The reversal could be 
the result of a shift of greater power to underwriters (versus the original owners) in the 
unregulated period. In fact, during the unregulated interval the variable representing underwriter 
reputation obtains a surprising positive coefficient. This indicates that reputable underwriters 
conducted IPOs with heavier underpricing in that period.  
We have conducted Chow tests to compare coefficients in two subsamples: the period 
with no price caps and the period with the strictest cap of (±8 percent). These are shown in the 
last column of Table 5. For three variables (Size, listing board classification and percent of 
ownership given in the IPO), as well as the variable of relative supply of IPOs (NUIPO), the 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients in the two sub-periods is rejected. 
The third and more general observation is that during the period without variation limits, 
several variables that appear to be dormant in the other subsamples come alive and perform a 
significant explanatory role. Size, listing board classification, relative market performance, 
ownership percentage offered are variables that appear significant and their coefficients are in 
the expected range. In part, this result is probably due to the fact that in the unregulated period 
the variation of the dependent variables is much greater across the sample than in the other 
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periods. The coefficient of variation of the dependent variable is 1.768 in the unregulated period 
but 1.057 and 1.456 respectively in the periods with the ±8 and the ±99 percent limits.  
Clearly, someone conducting cross-sectional tests of IPO performance during unregulated 
periods would reach starkly different results than if the observations had been drawn from 
periods with daily variation limits. Hence, institutional detail matters and regulatory changes 
should be carefully accounted for in tests of this type. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
The main conclusion of this study is that price cap effect is associated with reduced 
underpricing so this mechanism has been one way of decreasing the „money left on the table‟. In 
this section, we address the robustness of our novel evidence.  
The robustness check concentrates on the extremely „hot‟ period in order to ensure that 
our results are not simply driven by hot market conditions and investors‟ sentiment. It is possible 
that the very high returns observed in the latter part of 1999 drive the differences found during 
the regulated period when no hot market conditions of that magnitude were observed. Thus we 
repeat the regression under using three different exclusions. In the first case, we exclude both the 
third and fourth quarters of 1999, which shower historically exceptional returns. In the second 
case, we only exclude the fourth quarter of that year, in which we observe the highest returns. In 
the third occasion we exclude only three individual IPOs which during that period exhibited raw 
underpricing over 400 percent. In Table 6 the three columns represent the three exclusions. The 
findings support strongly the robustness of the original test. The period under a strict price cap of 
8 percent continues to capture a significant negative effect.  
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TABLE 6. Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAU as dependent 
variable for IPOs listed on ASE over the 1990-2011 period, (1) (excluding the „Hot‟ 3rd and 4th quarter of 
1999) (2) (excluding the „Hot‟ 4th quarter of 1999) (3) (excluding three major outliers) 
 
VARIABLES (1)  MAU IPOs listed with 
±8%, ±99% 
(2)  MAU IPOs listed  
with ±8%, ±99% 
(3) MAU IPOs listed  
with ±8%, ±99% 
Constant 120.1*** 15.32 65.99 
 (0.004) (0.818) (0.104) 
LBC 5.006 -3.175 5.099 
 (0.451) (0.723) (0.420) 
AGE 5.525 -0.752 3.620 
 (0.153) (0.880) (0.380) 
TLAG -0.138 0.807 0.0972 
 (0.552) (0.212) (0.717) 
PRIV -1.726 -6.253 -8.212 
 (0.889) (0.607) (0.502) 
SIZE -7.297*** -1.712 -4.921* 
 (0.006) (0.682) (0.0712) 
OVER 0.270*** 0.308*** 0.325*** 
 (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0043) 
UND 9.309 15.75* 14.30* 
 (0.197) (0.060) (0.0595) 
RET 1.925* 1.925* 1.293 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.160) 
NUIPO 5.325 3.783 4.912 
 (0.184) (0.411) (0.224) 
GO 0.0692 0.607 0.692 
 (0.849) (0.170) (0.156) 
IND 9.709 5.020 11.43 
 (0.187) (0.511) (0.140) 
PC8 -28.44*** -33.91*** -33.46*** 
 (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
PC99 -15.25 -12.52 -10.36 
 (0.156) (0.261) (0.346) 
    
Observations 331 339 346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.289 0.283 0.383 
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7. Discussion: Does the price cap achieve its target? 
A natural question that arises from our findings is if price cap adoption is effective as a 
general mechanism for improved efficiency in the IPO market. In this paper we find that price 
intervention restricted initial returns to investors. We offer three potential explanations for why price 
cap can protect the market during challenging times and can be considered as a tool by market 
regulators or even market makers. 
First, continuously changing international market conditions creates different needs and 
alternates investors‟ sentiment. In certain occasions, markets experience highly increases in stock 
prices (“stock rally” periods) and inexperienced investors can easily inveigle in crazy trading. This 
may lead them to earning high initial returns but may also lead them to choices that are unwise in the 
medium term. Investor protection is as crucial in the IPO market as in the secondary market.  
Second, issuers request from underwriters reduced amount of money left on the table. This is 
their way to judge the success of an issuance in addition to the total amount raised. Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) report $27 billion left on the table in the United States for a period of nine years. 
Further they show that most of the money left on the table comes from a minority of IPOs. 
Comparing these findings to ours, it is clear that price restrictions can be applied, even selectively, to 
reduce the transfer of wealth.  
Third, it is very clear in our evidence that the application of a price cap did not restrain IPO 
activity. In fact, during the almost four years of this regulatory constraint, IPO activity in the Greek 
stock exchanged flourished to produce a sample of 93 cases. These represent more than one quarter 
of all IPO activity over the period 1990-2010 that we examine. Thus, the constraint did not restraint 
the primary market, rather it reduced the „money left on the table‟.  
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8. Conclusion 
We conducted a direct test of the impact of price caps (in the form of daily variation 
limits) on IPO underpricing. There has been no other such direct test to our knowledge. The 
Greek market has offered this opportunity for testing, as daily variation limits for newly listed 
shares, enforced across the board, changed three times over seven years.  
Our basic finding supports the hypothesis that regulatory limits on price variation actually 
reduce underpricing. In fact, the evidence is very clear since this effect appears strong not only 
when we compare a period with narrow limits with a period with no limits, but also when we 
compare periods with limits of different range. Routine regulatory explanations of variation 
limits focus on the reduction of „speculation‟ and the moderation of market volatility. However, 
the results we have obtained show an unexpected gain in efficiency in the area of pricing of 
newly listed stocks which has not been previously recognized by researchers, nor has been 
explicitly embedded in regulatory arguments.  
We believe that our finding points to a unique feature because of its financial 
implications. The reduction of underpricing implies in the end that under regulatory constraint 
there is improvement in the efficiency of funding allocation.  Less „money on the table‟ means 
more money for the issuer and less money for the speculative trader.  
Our findings are robust, as we have included in the tests a number of other factors known 
to affect initial underpricing from the extensive international literature. From among a large set 
of such factors, one exhibits significant explanatory effects across regulatory variation regimes. 
This is the degree of excess demand which in fixed – price auctions is measured by a demand 
multiple and testifies to intensity of investor sentiment. Another important finding however is 
that in unregulated periods several control variables acquire a role, according to theoretical 
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prediction. Size, the demand conditions in the general market, the ownership percent offered and 
the listing board classification show significant effect. Our evidence also shows however that, 
counter to expectation, IPOs conducted by more reputable underwriters were more prone to 
underpricing. As the major Greek banks were classified as „reputable underwriters‟ in our sample 
this may indicate that underwriters other than banks were probably attempting to acquire market 
share by offering better terms to original owners.  
The application of price caps appears to motivate those who formulate the offer price to 
bring it closer to expected equilibrium price, as opportunities to „manipulate‟ investor sentiment 
are limited. The application of price limits clearly reduces opportunities for speculation in early 
trading.  
The implications of these results signify that market participants (issuers, underwriters, 
investors) adjust their behavior to the regulatory environment and this can explain responses of 
short-term performance to regulatory changes. A second implication, in line with the spirit of 
Boehmer and Colak (2012), is that, plausibly, the composition of participating investors is 
changing not only during hot IPO markets but also during periods with strict regulations.    
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APPENDIX A. Variables Definitions 
  
Variable Name  Variable Type of  Expected  
in Abbreviation Definition Measure Sign 
Panel A:  Measures of Abnormal Returns 
RIR Measures the returns at the end of the first day of trading. Continuous 
 
MAIR 
Returns to investors in the end of first day of trading adjusted with the returns of 
the market. Raw initial returns (RIR) are adjusted for market changes taking into 
account the Athens Stock Exchange General Index (ASEGI) between the offer 
price closing date and the end of first day of trading. 
Continuous 
 
RAU 
Level of underpricing (equilibrium or fair market price) which considers 2
nd
, 3
rd
 
etc days of trading until the IPO will reach its equilibrium. 
Continuous 
 
MAU 
Calculates the level of underpricing by the time the fair market price will occur. 
Returns are adjusted to count the market effect.     
Continuous 
 
Panel B:IPOs Characteristics 
LBC 
Dummy variable: 1 if an IPO is listed in Main Market and „0‟ if listed in Parallel 
or New Market. 
Discrete + 
AGE 
Age of the firm starting from the year of its establishment until the year it goes 
public. 
Continuous - 
Time Lag 
Period between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of 
trading. 
Continuous + 
PRIV 
Companies owed by State before going public. State sells part of its proportion 
on those companies in the market. 
Discrete + 
SIZE 
Market capitalization measured by log of the total number of outstanding shares 
after the IPO multiplied by price per share. 
Continuous - 
DM Demand multiple on the number of shares issued. Continuous + 
UR Dummy variable: 1 for reputable underwriters, 0 otherwise Discrete + 
OWN  Proportion of given ownership during the going public process. Continuous + 
IND Dummy variable: 1 for industrial classified companies, 0 otherwise. Discrete - 
Panel C: Market Characteristics 
RET Quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average. Continuous - 
NUIPO Quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average number of IPOs in each quarter. Continuous  + 
Panel D: Price Cap Characteristics 
Cap ±8% 
Dummy variable: 1 IPOs listed with a price cap limitation of ±8%, otherwise 0  
Cap ±8%: IPOs listed in ASE with a price cap limitation of ±8% during Nov. 
1993 – Nov. 1996 period. Discrete 
 
- 
Cap ±99% 
Dummy variable: 1 IPOs listed with a price cap limitation of ±99%, otherwise 0 
Cap ±99%: IPOs listed in ASE during Dec 1996 to Dec. 1999 period. Discrete 
 
- 
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Appendix B. Underpricing of Greek IPOs (Quarterly Returns) 
 
 Quarter No of IPOs Mean of RU (%) Mean of MAU (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No ceiling 
Jan 1990 – Mar 1990 4 129.26 114.34 
Apr 1990 – June 1990 5 147.65 116.14 
July 1990 – Sep 1990 9 94.12 96.89 
Oct 1990 – Dec 1990 10 27.52 30.48 
Jan 1991 – Mar 1991 2 30.44 10.77 
Apr 1991 – June 1991 5 47.18 51.90 
July 1991 – Sep 1991 6 34.35 37.00 
Oct 1991 – Dec 1991 1 -12.39 -14.98 
Jan 1992 – Mar 1992 3 -15.66 -14.29 
Apr 1992 – June 1992 1 9.72 7.39 
July 1992 – Sep 1992 1 -18.86 -31.67 
Oct 1992 – Dec 1992 
0 
- - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
±8% Cap 
Jan 1993 – Mar 1993 0 - - 
Apr 1993 – June 1993 0 - - 
July 1993 – Sep 1993 5 17.33 5.94 
Oct 1993 – Dec 1993 5 31.07 17.43 
Jan 1994 – Mar 1994 3 94.39 94.16 
Apr 1994 – June 1994 14 19.94 41.01 
July 1994 – Sep 1994 12 26.00 34.63 
Oct 1994 – Dec 1994 17 22.06 25.29 
Jan 1995 – Mar 1995 3 22.45 24.52 
Apr 1995 – June 1995 5 -2.55 -4.99 
July 1995 – Sep 1995 6 40.65 37.79 
Oct 1995 – Dec 1995 6 36.83 39.71 
Jan 1996 – Mar 1996 7 29.86 28.06 
Apr 1996 – June 1996 4 18.96 22.02 
July 1996 – Sep 1996 5 16.76 15.67 
Oct 1996 – Nov 1996 1 34.16 34.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
±99% Cap 
Dec 1996 - Mar 1997 5 5.79 1.70 
Apr 1997 – June 1997 4 17.84 10.83 
July 1997 – Sep 1997 4 51.79 51.83 
Oct 1997 – Dec 1997 2 100.76 108.79 
Jan 1998 – Mar 1998 5 74.68 64.06 
Apr 1998 – June 1998 3 93.21 70.78 
July 1998 – Sep 1998 7 91.56 91.45 
Oct 1998 – Dec 1998 8 51.54 44.06 
Jan 1999 – Mar 1999 7 98.47 85.75 
Apr 1999 – June 1999 9 92.07 89.17 
July 1999 – Sep 1999 8 222.90 202.00 
Oct 1999 –  Dec 1999 14 243.50 249.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 2000 – Mar 2000 18 136.75 136.98 
Apr 2000 – June 2000 14 27.75 31.07 
July 2000 – Sep 2000 13 8.63 9.06 
Oct 2000 –  Dec 2000 8 -2.99 -3.45 
Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 3 -0.67 4.58 
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No ceiling 
Apr 2001 – June 2001 7 69.87 68.26 
July 2001 – Sep 2001 5 -3.11 4.02 
Oct 2001 –  Dec 2001 
6 42.54 47.21 
 Jan 2002 – Mar 2002 8 70.86 72.01 
 Apr 2002 – June 2002 4 -2.34 0.59 
 July 2002 – Sep 2002 7 13.57 17.56 
 Oct 2002 –  Dec 2002 3 -11.16 -5.20 
 Jan 2003 – Mar 2003 5 -14.59 -15.17 
 Apr 2003 – June 2003 2 6.44 5.03 
 July 2003 – Sep 2003 6 19.83 7.77 
 Oct 2003 –  Dec 2003 2 16.26 25.97 
 Jan 2004 – Mar 2004 6 -8.19 -3.82 
 Apr 2004 – June 2004 4 -2.67 1.45 
 July 2004 – Sep 2004 0 - - 
 Oct 2004–  Dec 2004 1 -3.72 -7.03 
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  Figure 1: Number of IPOs in ASE and Athens Stock Exchange General Index return on a quarterly basis (1990-2011)  
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Figure 2: MAU and RAU on a quarterly basis over the period 1990-2011  
 
 
